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VOL. IV OCTOBER, 1929 NumiBm 4.
FEDERAL TAXATION OF COMMUINITY INCOMES-
THE RECENT HISTORY OF PENDING QUESTIONS
By the constitution of the United States, the Congress has power
to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the com-
mon defense and general welfare of the United States. The consti-
tution, however, also contains the further provision that no capita-
tion or other direct tax shall be laid unless apportioned among the
states in proportion to the population as ascertained by a federal
census. In the year 1895 in Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co.,
157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601, 39 L. ed. 759, 39 L. ed. 1108, the
Supreme Court of the United States decided that an income tax
is a direct tax and as a consequence that Congress could not impose
such tax unless apportioned among the states.
As a result of tins decision, a long continued agitation arose for
a constitutional amendment which would permit the levying of
a federal income tax without apportionment. The movement for
the constitutional change was successful and on February 25, 1913,
there took effect the Sixteenth Amendment reading-
"The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without appor-
tionment among the several states, and without regard
to any census or enumeration."
The first income tax law passed pursuant to tins new federal
power was enacted in 1913. Ever since that year there has been
in force a federal income tax law, but the terms and provisions
relating to the tax and its imposition have been changed seven
times by the new statutes passed in 1916, 1917, 1918-19, 1921, 1924,
1926 and 1928.
Soon after the enactment of the first statute, taxpayers residing
in states where the system of community property prevails asserted
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that since husband and wife have an equal proprietary interest in
such incomes as by state laws are defined to be community prop-
erty, their federal income tax returns should truthfully reflect this
joint ownership and that consequently husband and wife should
file separate returns, each spouse accounting for the ownership of
one-half of the entire community income.
There are eight community property states, Arizona, California,
Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington.
In all of these states except California, the wife's interest in the
community property and income (however income may be de-
fined) is recognized by the statutes and decisions as a vested
property right equal in all respects to the property right of the
husband.
In Califorma, as will be hereinafter shown, the rule in the past
has been different. In that State (prior to the modifictions and
changes in the California Community Property Law made by recent
statutes) it seems that the wife had no vested interest in the com-
munity property, her interest therein being a mere expectancy
I have not examined the recent California statutes but I am in-
formed that in one of them the California Legislature adopted a
specific declaration of its intent to create a vested interest in half
of the community property in the wife. The references made in this
paper to the state of the California law are intended to refer to
that law as it existed under former statutes and State decisions.
It is said that a new test case is being arranged in California to
determine whether, in the light of the new legislation, the wife in
California now has a vested interest in the community property so
as to change the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in U S. vs. Robbsns 269 U. S. 315, 70 L. ed. 285. As this
paper is intended to be a chronicle of the conditions leading up
to the present situation, the references herein made to the California
law, as existing at the time of the court rulings hereinafter men-
tioned, are not to be deemed as in any way intimating that the
present status of the California system would not now call for a
rule different from that laid down in the Robbins case.
In Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, in 1897, the Supreme
Court of that state held that the wife's interest was a mere
expectancy, and as to all the world except the wife, there
was no distinction between the community estate and separate
estate of the husband, that the amendment of 1891, forbidding
the husband to give away community property without the wife's
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written consent did not change the nature of the title, but merely
imposed a restraint upon alienation so far as concerned gifts of
community property
In 1908 the Supreme Court of California held in Estate of
Moffitt, 153 Cal. 359, 95 Pac. 653, 1025, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 207,
that since the wife had no vested interest in the community estate
and took her one-half on the death of her husband as has heir, the
wife must pay an inheritance tax on the share of the community
property so accruing to her on the death of her husband. This
case was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States (Mof-
fitt v. Kelly, 218 U. S. 400, 54 L. ed. 1086) where the judgment
of the lower court was affirmed, the court laying down the rule
that the nature and character of the rights of the wife in com-
munity property for the purpose of taxtion constitute a peculiarly
local question, and that the determination of the state court in
regard thereto was not reviewable by the Federal Supreme Court.
There have since been some further statutory changes in California,
and I shall not attempt to define their purpose or effect.
A general discussion and consideration of the decisions affecting
the rights of the wife in community property in California may be
found in the case of Stewart vs. Stewart, 199 Cal. 318, 249 Pac. 197,
decided in 1926.
Though the first federal income tax statute took effect in 1913,
the question of the right of husbands and wives to file separate
returns for community income in any of the states does not appear
to have been the subject of an official ruling until April, 1920, in
Office Decision No. 426, reported at 2 C. B. 198. That decision
gave specific recognition to the community property laws of two
states, Texas and Washington, and authorized returns dividing
the income between husband and wife so far as concerned the
income of accumulated community property, but not as to current
earnings. About a year earlier than this Office Decision concern-
ing income tax, there appeared Treasury Decision No. 2450, recog-
nizmg that one-half of the common estate belongs to each spouse
in determining the method of assessing the federal estate tax upon
the estate of a decedent spouse.
It should be also noted that as early as 1914 Treasury Decisions
2090 and 2137, without any reference to community property,
established that under the Revenue Act "the income of husband
and wife should not be combined in a return of income for the
purpose of assessing the additional or surtax," and that "the addi-
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tional or surtax imposed by the act will be computed on the basis
of the income of each individual," and that these decisions have
never been modified.
The ruling of Office Decision 426 in April, 1920, giving only
partial recognition to the community property system for income
tax purposes was unsatisfactory At the suggestion of parties in
interest, the Secretary of the Treasury requested the opinion of
the Attorney General.
On September 10, 1920 (date sometimes given as August 24,
1920), Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer in complying with
this request of the secretary, rendered an important opinion con-
cermng rights of husbands and wives domiciled in Texas, 32
Opinions of Attorneys General 229. The opinion is not long, but
it shows a careful investigation of the constitutional provisions,
statutes and decisions of the state of Texas and a thorough appre-
ciation of the line of demarcation between the province of federal
legislation and the province of state legislation in applying the
provisions of the Sixteenth Amendment and the statutes enacted
thereunder. In defining the nature of the community in Texas
and the rights of the spouses therein, the Attorney General said
"Their relation partakes of the nature of a partner-
ship in which each partner may have separate estates, or
property, as well as common stock of acquisitions and
gains. The business of the firm generally is transacted
in the name of the husband, and he prosecutes and defends
its suits with the same effect as if his partner were named
in the case (Simpson v. Brotherton, 62 Tex. 170), and
although community property has not all the inci-
dents of partnership property, it has many of them, and
is commonly spoken of as partnership property The
fact that one or the other of the spouses may do all the
work does not change the character of community prop-
erty (Yates v. Houston, 3 Tex. 452, 454) And though
the management and disposal of community property
during marriage are usually given to the husband, this
is said to be for reasons of public policy and social econ-
omy, and not on the grounds that the husband has any
greater interest in it than the wife."
The opinion then proceeds to quote from the Washington case
of Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 Wash. Ter. 255, 3 Pac. 841, where the
Supreme Court of Washington Territory in defining community
property rights in this state held that the community "is like a
partnership, in that some property coming from or through one or
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other or both of the individuals, forms for both a common stock,
winch bears the losses and receives the profits of its management,
and which is liable for individual debts, but it is unlike in that
there is no regard paid to proportionate contribution, service or
business fidelity, that each individual, once in it, is incapable of
disposing of his or her interest, and that both are powerless to
escape from the relationship, to vary its terms, or to distribute its
assets or its profits."
The Attorney General, after citing numerous other decisions and
statutory provisions, continues: "From the above authorities I am
convinced that under the laws of Texas the earnings of husband
and wife belong to them jointly in equal shares, that the commun-
ity interest attaches as soon as the right to the wages comes into
existence."
The Attorney General then discusses the provisions of the United
States Revenue Act of 1919 (40 Stat. 1065), which, as quoted by
him, imposed an income tax on "gains, profits and income derived
from salaries, wages, compensation for personal service of
whatever kind and in whatever form paid, or from professions,
vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in
property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership
or use of or interest in such property "
The Attorney General accordingly concludes and advises the
Secretary of the Treasury that husbands and wives m Texas in
rendering separate income tax returns may each report as gross
income one-half of the total earnings of the husband and wife, and
that the same is true as to the income derived from community
property already owned by husband and wife. This opinion was
immediately (September, 1920) promulgated as Treasury Deci..
sion 3071, reported at 3 C. B. 221.
Upon the rendition of this opinion, the Secretary of the Treas-
ury requested a further opinion of the Attorney General declar-
ing in what states other than Texas, n which the community
property system exists, may a husband and wife each report as
gross income one-half of the income, which under the laws of
such state becomes, simultaneously with its receipt, community
property It was requested that the opinion also cover the right
of the United States to impose an estate tax on the one-half of
the community property which becomes the sole property of the
wife on the death of the husband.
The response was a full and exhaustive opinion of Attorney
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General Palmer, dated February 26, 1921, and specifically answer-
ing the questions propounded with respect to all of the eight com-
munity property states, 32 Opinions of Attorneys General 435.
The statutes and decisions of each of the community property states
are thoroughly analyzed and considered. The portion of the opin-
ion referring to the State of Washington quotes the pertinent
statutory provisions and concludes.
"It appears to be the settled law of that state that the
wife has, during coverture, as well as upon the dissolu-
tion of the marriage, a vested and definite interest and
title in the community property, equal in all respects to
the interest and title of her husband therein. Leading
cases are Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 Wash. Ter. 235, Mabe
v. Whittaker, 10 Wash. 656, 39 Pac. 172, Marston v. Rue,
92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111, Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash.
309, 166 Pac. 634, Huyvaertz v. Roedtz, 105 Wash. 657,
178 Pac. 801."
Similar statements are made with respect to the community
property laws of the other seven states except California, with
respect to which the Attorney General says the statutes and deci-
sions of that state require a different holding. He says
"Summarizing, it appears that in all of the community
property states except California, their own courts have
held that the wife has, during the existence of the mar-
riage relation, a vested interest in one-half of the com-
munity property Her rights in the property of the
community are perhaps more fully recognized in the state
of Washington, where both spouses have testamentary
disposition over one-half of the community property, and
where in the absence of such disposition it descends to
their issue, or, in the absence of issue, to the survivor,
while the husband is manager of the community estate
in Washington, he may not sell, convey or encumber
real estate unless the wife join with him in the con-
veyance, and as was held in Huyvaertz v. Roedtz, ante, and
Schramm v. Steele, ante, the separate debt of the husband
cannot be satisfied out of community property where it is
not incurred in connection with community business, nor
for the benefit of the community "
This opinion concludes by stating that the answers to the ques-
tions are, therefore
" (1) That in Washington, Arizona, Idaho, New Mex-
ico, Louisiana and Nevada the husband and wife doni-
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oiled therein, in rendering separate income tax returns,
may each report as gross income one-half of the income
winch under the laws of the respective states becomes,
simultaneously with its receipt, community property
"(2) In the states mentioned, in answer to question
one, there should be included in gross estate, in comput-
ing the estate tax of the deceased spouse, one-half only of
the community property of husband and wife domiciled
therein.
"(3) Neither of the above answers is based upon a
statute enacted subsequent to March 1, 1913."
These opinions rendered by the responsible and authoritative
legal adviser of the government were, of course, accepted by the
Treasury Department and were adopted as the rule of action.
Thins opinion of February 26, 1921, was promulgated by Treasury
Decision 3'138, approved by the Secretary of the Treasury March
3, 1921. Internal Revenue Bulletin No. 4 for June, 1921, page 238.
Later it was submitted to the Senate and printed in the Con-
gressional Record.
During and since the year 1921, it has been the practice for
husbands and wives in the State of Washington and in other com-
munity property states, except California, to make separate re-
turns, each reporting one-half of the community income, and the
federal income tax has been imposed and collected accordingly
The application of this practice, however, has not been without
occasional objection from responsible sources. As a result of a
suggestion emanating from the Treasury Department, the Revenue
Act of 1921 as introduced in the House of Representatives, as re-
ported by the Ways and Means Committee of the House and as
passed by the House contained the following clause.
"Income received by any community shall be included
in the gross income of the spouse having management
and control of the community property "
The same Revenue Act of 1921 as reported by the Finance
Committee of the Senate, substituted for the above quoted clause
the followmg-
"Income received by any marital community shall be
included in the gross income of the spouse having the
management and control of the community property, and
shall be taxed as the income of such spouse."
The Senate Finance Committee in making its report to the
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Senate discussed the foregoing provisions as follows, at page 14
of the report.
"Under an opinion of the Attorney General, residents
of the states having a community property law enjoy
marked advantage over residents of other states. Income
which in other states is taxed as a unit to the husband,
is divided between husband and wife in states having
community property laws, and surtaxes are correspond-
ingly reduced. An amendment is added to this section
designed to restore uniformity of treatment by providing
that income received by any marital community shall be
included in the gross income of the spouse having the
management and control of the community property and
shall be taxed as the income of such spouse."
The naive statement of a design "to restore uniformity of treat-
ment" in the manner indicated, is noteworthy In none of the
forty so-called common law states is the income of the wife added
to the income of the husband and surtaxed accordingly In all of
those states the wife's earnings instead of being combined with
the husband's for federal taxation are reported and taxed separ-
ately Such property as the husband transfers to his wife to
assure her of a proprietary interest produces an income which is
taxed only to the wife. In the State of Washington by common
consent, in lieu of a voluntary transfer from husband to wife,
the law creates in her, for her protection, a half interest in the
community property Is this interest of the wife less entitled
to recognition than that transferred voluntarily by a husband in
an Eastern state ' Of course not.
In other words, this apparently innocent but really guileful
suggestion would use the community property laws of the State
of Washington and six other states to penalize husband and wife
by recognizing and enforcing the community property law so far
as it combines the earnings of the wife with the earnings of the
husband and places in one common fund the income of her share
of the marital accumulations along with the husband's share of
those accumulations. Having recognized the community prop-
erty law so far, this suggestion would then by arbitrary fiat make
the combined income all the husband's for federal taxation and
surtaxation, thus ignoring the true purpose and effect of the state
rule of property and refusing to recognize the ownership to be
where the state law puts it, namely, in the two spouses jointly
This would be to make use of the community property law only for
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the purpose of combining the two incomes as a partnership fund
and then to repudiate it by surtaxing the two incomes as one.
However, this entire proposed amendment was stricken out in
the Senate, and the Revenue Act of 1921, as enacted, contained
only the pre-existing provisions for the taxation of individuals
on the one hand and corporations on the other. For the debate
and action in the Senate see Vol. 61, Congressional Record, No.
140, for October 27, 1921, page 6872 et seq., and same volume No.
146, for November 3, 1921, page 7229.
Again when Congress was about to meet in December, 1923, Sec-
retary Mellon in his report, which was submitted to Congress,
recommended that the new revenue law about to be enacted should
contain provisions similar to those which had been suggested but
had been refused enactment in the previous Congress, relating to
community incomes. As a result of the recommendation of the
Treasury, the revenue bill introduced at the opening session of the
Congress on December 17, 1923 (which bill as later amended be-
came the Revenue Act of 1924), contained the following provision.
"Income received by any marital community shall be
included in the gross income of the spouse having the
management and control of the community property, and
shall be taxed as the income of such spouse."
This proposed amendment, however, got no farther than the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House, and the bill as re-
ported by that committee to the House eliminated the foregoing
clause and contained no reference to community incomes. Thus
again the proposed change failed to meet with favorable consider-
ation in Congress when analyzed in the light of natural justice
and constitutional limitations. See Hearings before Committee on
Ways and Means, House Reports, Revenue Revision 1924, pp. 194,
348, 375, 478, 482.
So the Revenue Act of 1924, like all of its predecessors (and,
it may be said in anticipation, like all of its successors), imposed
a tax upon the net income of every sndivsdual with no reference
to community property and consequently no attempt at differen-
tiation between individuals in any part of the United States. Since
the Congressional session of 1923-24, no further effort has been
made, either by any of the executive departments of the United
States government or by anyone else, to have Congress legislate
specifically against the interest of community property taxpayers,
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and no one in Congress has brought forth any proposition to sup-
plement the word "individual" in the revenue acts by any lan-
guage referring to community incomes.
It should be noted that in December, 1920, before the rendition
of the second opinion of Attorney General Palmer extending his
Texas ruling to all the community property states except Cali-
fornia, the question of the right of the United States to impose an
estate tax upon the one-half of the community property passing
to the wife on the death of her husband in California, came before
Judge Rudkin sitting in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. Blum v. Wardell, 270 Fed. 309.
There Judge Rudkin held that the wife's share of the community
property was not subject to the federal estate tax. This decision
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, in October, 1921,
Wardell v. Blum, 276 Fed. 226. The government's petition for
certiorari was denied March 6, 1922, 258 U. S. 617, 66 L. ed. 793.
These decisions regarding the federal estate tax on community
property in California, until overruled by the same Circuit Court
of Appeals six years later, as shown below, seemed to create for
the time being an anomalous situation, in that the federal estate
tax and the federal income tax, winch should logically have the
same basis of application, were governed by different rules of
property in California.
The decision of Wardell v Blum led to two further opinions by
Attorneys General of the United States.
In December, 1923, the Secretary of the Treasury addressed a
letter to Attorney General Daugherty requesting a reconsideration
of so much of the second opinion of Attorney General Palmer
(February 26, 1921) as held that that portion of the community
property passing to the wife upon the death of the husband in
California was subject to the federal estate tax. In an opinion
dated March 8, 1924, addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury
(34 Opinions of Attorneys General 376) Attorney General Daugh-
erty reviewed the California statutes and the decisions of the
Supreme Court of that state. He found cases tending to support
the theory of some sort of an actual interest on the part of the wife
and other cases tending the other way In resolving this con-
fusion the Attorney General followed the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals in Wardell v. Blum, 276 Fed. 226, and ruled
that the opinion of Attorney General Palmer should be modified
to the extent of declaring that no federal estate tax should be
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levied on community property m California passing to the wife on
the death of the husband. He says:
"In fact, I am of opinion no established rule can be
gathered from the decided cases in that state. The conclu-
sion I have announced above, as based on the Blum
decision, is, however, in harmony with decisions of the
courts of other states where the community property
system is maintained and with pronouncements of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
He cites in this connection Mabne v. 'Whittaker, 10 Wash. 656,
39 Pac. 172, Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484, 44 I. ed. 555,
and Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311, 55 L. ed. 477.
On May 27, 1924, Attorney General Stone, having recently suc-
ceeded Attorney General Daugherty, on his own motion recalled
the last mentioned opinion of Attorney General Daugherty for
further consideration and review. On October 9, 1924, the subject
was again treated m an opinion by Attorney General Stone (34
Opinions of Attorneys General 395.) This opinion calls attention
to the difficulty of extracting any rule from the California cases,
saying,
"The confusion in the decisions of the California
courts has undoubtedly arisen from the fact that the
courts have been attempting, in their opinions, to apply
the terminology of the common law to community prop-
erty, which embodies a legal concept wholly foreign to the
common law, and to which the terminology of the common
law cannot be applied with accuracy and precision."
Speaking of the principles applicable to community property
generally he quotes from Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311, 55 L. ed.
477, where the court said.
"For it is conceded by the court below and everywhere,
we believe, that in one way or another she has a remedy
for an alienation made in fraud of her by her husband."
Attorney General Stone also called attention to the fact that
since 1916 there had been two general revisions of the Revenue
Law (that of 1921 and that of 1924), and that despite endeavors
of officials of the Treasury to have Congress insert special provi-
sions requiring so-called joint income of husband and wife to be
returned as a single income of the husband, Congress had stricken
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from the revenue bills all provisions to that effect and had enacted
the new revenue laws in the old language so far as concerns the
point under consideration. He finally concluded by saying-
"I am unable to find those considerations, which would,
in my opinion, justify the government in beginning anew
in some other case a judicial controversy which was liti-
gated to a final conclusion in Blum v. Wardell and in
which the government's position was fully presented. Since
the opinion of the Attorney General (Daugherty) above
referred to was an affirmance of the rule laid down in
that case, I am constrained to re-establish and re-affirm
that opinion."
Attorney General Stone, however, took pains to say that he was
speaking only of the estate tax and that he expressed no opinion
with respect to the principles concerning the taxation of com-
munity incomes.
It was in the judicial department of the United States govern-
ment rather than the executive or legislative that the subject of
federal taxation of community incomes was next mooted. Com-
munity tax payers in California were much dissatisfied with the
ruling of Attorney General Palmer in holding that the laws of
California, although generally known as community property laws,
were not such as to give a wife a vested interest in the community
income with the consequent right to file an individual return, re-
porting a share of that income as her own. A test suit was accord-
ingly begun in 1925 in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California to reverse as to California tax-
payers the ruling of the Attorney General. The action was brought
by R. D Robbins, Jr., and Sadie Robbins as executors of R. D.
Robbins, to recover back from the United States a sum
which had been paid as income tax by the decedent for the year
1918 consequent upon the refusal of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to recoguize a division of that income between Robbins
and his wife.
The case was heard before District Judge Partridge. In stat-
ing the facts, Judge Partridge said of the case
"Admittedly, however, it is presented here as a test
case in order that appeal may be had directly to the
Supreme Court, and it is said that, if the suit goes against
the government, the Treasury will be compelled to refund
to citizens of the State of California a sum in excess of
$77,000,000."
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The District Judge made a lengthy review of the statutes and
decisions in the several community property states, comparing
the law of California with the laws of the seven other states, and
arrived at the conclusion that the amendments to the statutory
laws of California enacted in 1901, 1913, and 1917 had so restricted
the rights and powers of the husband with respect to community
property, that the wife's interest therein must be regarded as
vested and that the husband's dominion over the community
property in California was no broader (so far as concerned the
questions before him) than in other community property states.
Accordingly he held that the wife was really the owner of one-
half of the community income and entered judgment that Robbins
recover back from the United States the amount sued for.
Judge Partridge's decision in the Robbns case was appealed to
the Supreme Court of the United States.
The nature of the rights of the spouses in community property
had already been considered by that court m several cases, not-
ably Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484, 44 L. ed. 555, a case from
Washington decided in 1900, and Arnett v. Reade, 220 U. S. 311,
55 I. ed. 477, a New Mexico case decided in 1911. In both of
those cases, the court held that the wife possessed a present vested
interest in community property and in both the court used the
expression that the control of community property was given to
the husband "not because he was the exclusive owner, but because
by law he was created the agent of the community " In the New
Mexico case (Arnett v. Reade), Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the
opinion and Mr. Justice McKenna, the California member of the
court, dissented, he evidently being imbued with the deep-seated
California idea that the wife's interest is a mere expectancy and
not a vested property right.
The appeal in the Robbins case was argued in the Supreme Court
in December, 1925. On January 4, 1926, the court rendered a
decision completely reversing the decision of Judge Partridge,
U S. v. Robbsns, 269 U. S. 315, 70 L. ed. 285. Justice Holmes
wrote the opinion and was supported by seven other justices. Jus-
flee Sutherland dissented and Justice Stone took no part.
In the opinon by Justice Holmes, the learned justice says.
"We can see no sufficient reason to doubt that the
settled opinion of the Supreme Court of California, at
least with reference to the time before the latter statutes,
is that the wife had a mere expectancy while living with
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her husband. The latest decision that we have seen deal-
ing directly with the matter explicitly takes that view,
says that it is a rule of property that has been settled for
more than sixty years, and shows Arnett v. Reade, supra,
would not be followed in that state (California) Roberts
v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 611, 614, 218 Pac. 22 (de-
cided in 1923) In so doing it accords with the intima-
tions of earlier cases and does no more than embody the
commonly prevailing understanding with regard to Cali-
fornia law as shown by commentators and the action of
the Treasury Department as well as by the declarations
of the court."
The announcement of this view by the Federal Supreme Court
settled the entire question at issue in that case, because if the
California wife did not have a vested interest in community prop-
erty during the continuance of the marriage but had a mere ex-
pectancy, as the Supreme Court finds, the wife had no income
on which tax could be levied and there was nothing further to be
decided in the case, with the result that the judgment had to be
reversed.
However, Justice Holmes added another paragraph to the opin-
ion, which must be regarded as dictum for all practical pur-
poses of the case, though sometimes referred to in discussions of
the case as a "secondary line of reasoning." In this final par-
agraph Justice Holmes considers in detail varous provisions of
the California community property law and says that even if the
court be wrong in viewing the wife's rights as a mere expectancy
and if the court should "assume that the wife had an interest in
the community income, that Congress could tax if so minded, it
does not follow that Congress could not tax the husband for the
whole." Further reviewing the nature of the husband's rights in
California, the learned justice continues
"Although restricted in the matter of gifts, etc., he
alone has the disposition of the fund. He may spend it
substantially as he chooses, and if he wastes it in de-
bauchery, the wife has no redress. His liability for his
wife's support comes from a different source and exists
whether there is community property or not. That he
may be taxed for such a fund seems to us to need no argu-
ment. The same and further considerations lead to the
conclusion that it was intended to tax him for the whole.
For not only should he, who has all the power, bear the
burden, and not only is the husband the most obvious tar-
get for the shaft, but the fund taxed, while liable to be
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taken for his debts, is not liable to be taken for the wife's,
Civil Code See. 167, so that the remedy for her failure to
pay nught be hard to find. The reasons for holding him
are at least as strong as those for holding trustees in the
eases where they are liable under the law. See. 219."
Some of the government attorneys, anxious to reverse the rul-
ing by which wives having a vested interest in community prop-
erty in the seven community property states, other than California,
are allowed to file separate returns, profess to regard the final
paragraph of Justice Holmes' decision as applicable to the other
community property states. There is in fact no foundation for
this latter view. The entire line of reasoning in the final para-
graph of Justice Holmes' opinion is based upon the provisions of
California law, none of which are found, for instance, in the com-
munity property laws of the State of Washington. In this state
it is not true that the husband alone has the disposition of the
fund, nor that he may spend it substantially as he chooses, nor that
if he wastes it in debauchery, the wife has no redress, nor that
his liability for his wife's support comes from a different source
and exists whether there is community property or not. Nor is
it true in the State of Washington that the community fund is
liable to be taken for the husband's debts, and is not liable to
be taken for the wife's. The decisions of the Supreme Court of
Washington, as far as this state is concerned, negative each of the
propositions of law found in the California statutes and decisions
which were made the basis of the dictum or secondary line of rea-
soning of Justice Holmes.
It is important to note that the question treated in the final
paragraph of the Robbsns opinion was not contended for or even
suggested by counsel for the United States, either in their briefs or
in the oral argument. Both the government counsel and the oppos-
ing counsel admitted, as the Treasury Department and the Attor-
ney General had ruled for many years, that the sole question at
issue in the case was whether or not the wife had a one-half vested
ownership in the community income under the statutes and deci-
sions of California, and that the right to make separate returns
under existing rulings and decisions depended entirely and alone
on. the question of the vested half ownership.
Since the considerations discussed in the final pragraph of Jus-
tice Holmes' decision were not contended for by the government,
but, on the contrary, were assumed on all sides to be clearly set-
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tled in the light of the plain meaning of the various revenue acts
as well as the previous executive and legislative history of the
community property controversy (to say nothing of the constitu-
tional power of Congress to tax one person for income belonging
to another and to surtax one individual by adding income belong-
ing to him to income belonging to another), nothing was said by
counsel for either side in the way of stating facts relevant to this
new point. Such relevant facts would have included the showing
that Congress had twice rejected two amendments attempting to
tax and surtax husbands on the entire community income irres-
pective of the question of vested ownership, and that these amend-
ments, rejected by Congress, embody the same principles as that
involved in the idea suggested by Justice Holmes. On the question
of the "power and intent," the legislative history (as to which the
Supreme Court had no information) clearly negatives the "in-
tent." The "power" to tax and surtax the husband for an income
belonging to the wife will be found, on analyzing the final para-
graph of the opinion itself, to be asserted as being co-extensive
only with the status created by California law and not to extend
to the community property status existing in any other state.
The able opinion of Acting Attorney General Mitchell rendered
July 16, 1927 (35 Opinions of Attorneys General 265), herein-
after mentioned, declares that the question of federal taxation of
community incomes involves only the question of the wife's vested
interest as fixed by local state law That opinion nowhere inter-
prets the decision in the Robbsns case as asserting any power or
intent on the part of Congress to tax and surtax the husband on
the joint income in the states where, by local statutes and court
decisions, the community property is recognized to belong to both
spouses jointly If the writer may be permitted to indulge in
paraphrase, Mr. Mitchell apparently interpreted the final para-
graph of Justice Holmes' opinion as saying in effect.
"Even if we should have regard to those California
cases tending toward a more liberal construction of the
wife's rights (some of which are mentioned, pro and con,
in the opinions of Attorneys General Daugherty and
Stone, who call attention to the confused and indefinite
nature of the California holdings) and should thereby
be led to believe that the courts of that state would hold
the wife's interest to be something more than a mere ex-
pectancy, nevertheless, taking into consideration all of
the provisions of the system in force in California in
1918 (especially those provisions to which we call atten-
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tion), it would still be our holding that the wife's interest
under that system was not substantial enough to entitle
her to return half of the income as her own under the
Revenue Act of 1918." (Quotation and paraphrasing
mine.)
To avoid misunderstanding I repeat and emphasize the fact that
the language enclosed in these quotation marks was not used by Mr.
Mitchell but the quoted language is merely my interpretation of
what I gather to have been the view that Mr. Mitchell expressed.
So after all the Robbns case would, in any event, rest purely
on the indefinite nature of the wife's interest under the Cali-
fornia decisions.
Further, Justice Holmes' secondary reasoning does not purport
to be self-contained or complete, and could not serve alone as a
basis of judgment if divorced from the context which ties it to the
California law. The analogy suggested to the case of a trustee
would have to be completed by indicating that the income of the
beneficiary of a trust is not added to the income of the trustee so
that a surtax may be inposed upon the two combined. If there
are two identified and living beneficiaries of a trust, the incomes
of the two are not added together for tax or surtax. These con-
siderations would not support (outside of California) the conclu-
sion as to the "power and intent" of Congress. Undoubtedly the
law can, and in some instances does, require a person having pos-
session of a fund to pay another person's tax out of that fund.
Tins is no more than a statutory garnishment. A surtax based
on the combining of incomes belonging to two individuals is a
very different matter.
Judge Partridge's remark in the record m the Robbmns case that
a decision adverse to the government would compel the refunding
to the citizens of the State of California of sums in excess of $77,-
000,000 may have created in the Supreme Court a psychology un-
fortunate for the taxpayers. I may remark here that success of
the taxpayers in suits now pending would not involve the Treas-
ury in any refund whatever.
Immediately upon the publication of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Robbins case in January, 1926, Treasury officials
raised the question whether under the final paragraph of the deci-
sion, the ruling of Attorney General Palmer should not be reversed
as to all community property states. Objections to such reversal
of the long-prevailing ruling and the practice were immediately
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voiced in all the states affected and the matter was called to the
attention of the delegations of these states in both houses of Con-
gress.
The general feeling was expressed that while the dictum or sec-
ondary line of reasoning in the opinion manifestly was not based
upon anything found m the community property laws of the other
states, nevertheless it would be wise to have any doubt set at rest
as far as past liabilities were concerned. Senator Wesley L. Jones
of the State of Washington took the initiative and early in Feb-
ruary, 1926, while the Senate was considering the Revenue Act of
1926, he moved as an amendment that the following provision
be inserted in page 12 of the bill, namely
"The liability of any taxpayer under any internal rev-
enue law shall be determined, unless such taxpayer other-
wise consents or requests, in accordance with the Treas-
ury decisions, opinions of the Attorney General and regu-
lations made by the commissioner or the secretary, or by
the commissioner with the approval of the secretary, in
force at the time his return was made, whether such re-
turn was made before or after the enactment of this act.
As used in this subdivision, the term return means, in
the case of a return which has been amended, the return
as finally amended."
This amendment was accepted and inserted in the bill by the
Senate. Later the Senate amendment was objected to by the Treas-
ury Department because it was considered too broad in its scope,
although it was agreed that claims based on the community prop-
erty status should be quieted. The amendment was, therefore,
redrafted to quiet only claims that might be made with respect to
the community property status. Other matters which Congress
desired to quiet were treated in separate amendments. It is stated
on reliable authority that the substitute amendment for the Jones
amendment was prepared by the attorneys for the Internal Rev-
enue Bureau as a quieting statute, in order to meet the views of
the senators and congressmen from community property states.
The substitute amendment was accordingly enacted and became
Section 1212 of the Revenue Act of 1926, as follows
"See. 1212. Income for any period before January 1,
1925, of a marital community, in the income of which the
wife has a vested interest, as distinguished from an expec-
tancy, shall be held to be correctly returned if returned
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by the spouse to whom the income belonged under the
state law applicable to such marital community for such
period."
Three observations are suggested by this section: First, the
section recognizes that there are marital communities where un-
der the state law community income belongs to more than one
spouse. This recognition is of importance because naturally in-
come cannot be taxed to one to whom this income does not belong
by adding such income to the individual income of another and
surtaxing both. Second, this section is a statute of repose intended
to set at rest any question of liability for federal taxation of com-
munity incomes for the year 1924 and previous years where sep-
arate returns had been filed by husband and wife. Acting Attor-
ney General Mitchell in his opinion of July 16, 1927 (hereinafter
considered) says "it is only in the nature of a statute of limita-
tions." Third, the Revenue Act of 1926, so far as concerned its
enactments for the future, embodied the identical language of the
former aqts in taxing the income of "individuals," which lan-
guage had been uniformly interpreted by Attorneys General and
administrative officials as calling for separate returns and separ-
ate taxation of husbands and wives for community incomes in
seven states.
It may be remarked here parenthetically that the assessment of
additional income taxes for the year 1924 and previous years is
now barred not only by Section 1212, but also by the three-year
statutory limitation. As to any additional assessment for the year
1925, the bar became effective March 15, 1929. The three-year bar
will apply to any additional assessment for the year 1926 on March
15, 1930.
Besides leading to the enactment by Congress of the above
quoted Section 1212 of the Revenue Law of 1926, the final para-
graph of the decision in the Robbins case has had another important
effect. It has led to the institution of test suits in all the com-
munity property states except California, with the intention of
having those suits carried to the Supreme Court of the United
States, one from each of the seven community property states con-
cerned, so that an authoritative decision may be had in that
tribunal concerning the rights of husbands and wives to file separ-
ate returns.
In the latter part of January, 1926, some three weeks after the
announcement of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Robbins
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case, Attorney General Sargent, in conjunction with Solicitor Gen-
eral Mitchell, publicly announced that the Attorney General was
considering whether the dictum or secondary line of reasoning of
Justice Holmes applied to states other than California. He gave
public notice that on a fixed date in February, he would give a
hearing to any representatives of taxpayers m the community
property states desiring to state their views on the subject and at
the same time inviting the filing of briefs.
The hearing duly took place. There were oral statements by
representatives of taxpayers from the states of Washington,
Louisiana and Texas and some other states and printed briefs
were filed. In behalf of taxpayers of the State of Washington a
printed brief was submitted and an oral argument made by coun-
sel of the Seattle Chamber of Commerce. As a result of that hear-
mg the Solicitor General wrote a letter on March 12, 1926, to each
of the counsel who had appeared before him, in which he said.
"Owing to the question arising under the uniform-
ity clause of the federal constitution, I feel that the real
problem in the case is to ascertain the intrinsic nature
of the wife's interest in the community income in each
of the states. The way to determine whether the wife
has such an ownership m the income as entitles her to re-
turn a part of it as her own, is to ascertain, from the
statutes and decisions of her state, just what rights of
ownership she may exercise respecting the community
income. "
The letter further set forth a list of specific questions on which
the Solicitor General requested the counsel in each community
property state to prepare a further brief to be submitted to him
in the following month of April. In obedience to this question, fur
ther briefs were filed in April, 1926, by counsel of the Seattle
Chamber of Commerce and counsel representing tax-paying bodies
in several other community property states, especially Louisiana
and Texas, making direct answers to the questions propounded
by the Solicitor General and setting forth the pertinent statutory
provisions and decisions. For more than a year the matter was
held under advisement by the Attorney General and Solicitor
General.
On July 16, 1927, Hon. William D. Mitchell, Solicitor General,
as Acting Attorney General, addressed to the Secretary of the
Treasury a very important opinion, (35 Opinions of Attorneys
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General 265). This able state paper refers to the two opinions of
Attorney General Palmer of 1920 and 1921 and considers whether
the decision in United States v. Robbms requires any modification
thereof. The reasonng of this latest opinion is in entire harmony
with the position taken by counsel for the taxpayers of the com-
munity property states.
Salient quotations are as follows.
"In determining the nature of an interest in com-
munity income created by state law, it is necessary for
the federal courts to accept the decisions of the state
courts construing the statutes creating the interest and to
determine from the statutes and decisions of the state
courts the intrinsic nature of that interest."
"Decisions of the state courts holding what rights of
a proprietary nature the wife may exercise in respect of
community income are binding on the federal courts."
"There are very substantial differences between the
so-called community property systems in these various
states. No two of them are just alike. Some resemble
very closely the system tn Califorma dealt with n the
Robbins case, but in other states the systems differ very
considerably from the California system."
"As the nature and extent of a wife's interest in com-
munity income are matters determined by the laws of
the state, Congress may not by any enactment change the
nature of the wife's interest."
The conclusion of this opinion is that a determination by the
United States Supreme Court should be made to settle the prob-
lem for each of the community property states. Consequently
the Attorney General withdrew the two opinions of Attorney
General Palmer and advised that test cases be brought in the sev-
eral community property states and carried to the Supreme Court
of the United States to set the question at rest with respect to tax-
payers in each state concerned. He expressed the view that the
practice then prevailing for dealing with community income in
seven states should not be overturned by administrative action, but
should continue, pending final determination by the courts.
Next m chronological order should be mentioned Talcott v.
United States, 23 Fed. (2) 897 (certiorari denied 72 L. ed. 686)
where the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit in Janu-
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ary, 1928, overruled their holding of six years before in Wardell
v. Blum, 276 Fed. 226, and ruled that a wife in California must
pay a United States estate tax on the one-half of the community
property which by statute she receives on the death of the hus-
band. This new view of the law was based in part on the decision
of the Supreme Court in the Bobbmns case and in part on recent
rulings of the Supreme Court of California reasserting the absence
of a vested interest on the part of the wife in community prop-
erty
As a result of the opinion of Acting Attorney General Mitchell
and his recommendation of test suits, conferences and corres-
pondence were resumed between the counsel representing the tax-
payers in the several community property states. At various
times these counsel have also had conferences with the General
Counsel of Internal Revenue regarding the course to be pursued.
As a consequence test suits were begun and carried on as fol-
lows
The Texas test suit, Bacon v. Hopkins, was decided in favor of
the Texas taxpayers by the United States District Court in Texas
in June, 1928. Bacon v. Hopkins, 27 Fed. (2) 140. The appeal
taken by the Internal Revenue Bureau from that decision is now
pending before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit.
The Washington test suit, Seaborn v. Poe, was decided in favor
of the Washington taxpayers by the United States District Court
in Washington, Judge Cushman presiding, in May, 1929. Seaborn
v. Poe, 32 Fed (2) 916. This case also has been appealed and is
pending before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit where it will be heard during the coming month
of October.
The Arizona test suit, Koch v. Goodell, was decided in favor of
the Arizona taxpayers by the United States District Court in Ari-
zona in March, 1929. This case also has been appealed and will
also be heard before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit in October.
The Louisiana test suit, Pfaff v. Bender, is pending in the
United States District Court for Lousiana, not yet having been
called up for hearing. It is to come on for final disposition in
that court during the coming month of September.
Plans are maturing for similar test suits in Idaho, Nevada and
New Mexico.
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It is to be noted, therefore, that m all of, the states where test
suits have been decided by the local District Courts, the decision
has been in favor of the taxpayers, that is to say, in favor of sus-
taining the present practice of individual returns with division of
the community income between husband and wife.
No decision has yet been rendered in a Circuit Court of Appeals
directly in any of the test suits. There are decisions of two Circuit
Courts of Appeals which seem to indicate rather strongly that
those courts will affirm the decisions of the District Courts. Last
February, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
(which includes the states of Texas and Louisiana) had before it
a case where husband and wife, citizens of Texas, had made sep-
arate returns dividing community property income and the wife
asserted the clann that the half of the salary paid to the husband
winch the wife returned as her own income, must be treated as
earned income of the wife as if she had personally worked for it.
The court upheld the wife's right so to treat the income. McLarry
v. Commtsswner, 30 Fed. (2) 789. This ruling is contrary to the
practice heretofore pursued by the commissioner, which has been to
divide the income between the two spouses, to allow the husband
to treat his half as earned income, but to refuse a similar privi-
lege to the wife unless she personally participated in the earning.
Last April the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit
had before it the case of Rucker v. Commissioner, 32 Fed. (2) 222,
involving an income tax assessment for 1918 on community income
in the State of Washington, for which the husband and wife had
made separate returns dividing the income, but the commissioner
had assessed the entire income to the husband. The Circuit Court
of Appeals in a unammous opinion written by Judge Dietrich, in
which Judges Gilbert and Rudlkn concurred, reviewed, in succinct
and comprehensive language, the community property statutes of
the State of Washington and the court decisions thereunder and
upheld the right of separate returns and division of income, say-
mg among other things
"The wife has during coverture, as well as upon dis-
solution of the marriage, a vested and definite interest
and title in community property, equal in all respects to
the interest and title of her husband theren,"
citing Marston v, Rue, 92 Wash. 129, Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash.
309, Huyvaertz v. Roedtz, 105 Wash. 657, and the opinion of
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Attorney General Palmer of February 26th, 1921. This decision
seems clearly to foreshadow an affirmance of the decision of Judge
Cushman in Seaborn v. Poe. The only point of distinction so far
attempted by opposing counsel is that the case of Rucker v. Blair,
being for an assessment for the year 1918, is within the added pro-
tection afforded by Section 1212 of the Revenue Act of 1926,
already mentioned, which quieted claims for reassessment with
respect to certain marital communities for periods before January
1, 1925. The court opinion shows, however, that the decision
broadly covers the entire question.
Attention should also be given to the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Earl v. Commisswner,
30 Fed. (2) 898, where in February, 1929, that court upheld the
right of separate returns dividing the income between the two
spouses even as to residents of California, where it was shown that
a written agreement had been made at the time of the marriage
agreeing that the earnings of the husband and of the wife should
be the joint property of both, a form of agreement recognized and
permitted by the California statutes.
Until the case of Seaborn v. Poe has been determined by the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and until the Supreme
Court of the United States has either reviewed and decided that
case or has refused an application for certiorari, it cannot be
definitely asserted that the validity of the present practice of
divided returns by husband and wife in tins state has been put
beyond controversy
What as to the modus vivendi, the temporary arrangement for
getting along, pending the time when the Supreme Court shall
have decided the contested point? In the informal conferences
held between counsel representing community taxpayers in the
several states and the General Counsel of Internal Revenue, pre-
paratory to the beginning of the test suits, official assurances were
given (by authority of the commissioner, it was understood) that
if the test suits were promptly begun and prosecuted with dili-
gence, the existing practice of divided returns would be con-
tinued until a contrary ruling should be made by the Supreme
Court. This understanding is being carried out. It was put into
record form and published by the commissioner on April 6, 1929,
Mimeograph 3723, Cumulative Bulletin VIII-17-4182.
The Revenue Act of 1928 contains a provision in Section 1108 to
the effect that the Treasury Department, in changing any regula-
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tion or practice, may apply the change without retroactive effect,
even though the change be required by some authoritative court
decision. This provision was inserted in the 1928 law at the sug-
gestion of counsel for taxpayers in the community property states,
so that, in the possible event that the pending test suits should
result adversely to the taxpayers in any state, the Secretary of the
Treasury or the commissioner would not be obliged to impose a
re-assessment on community incomes, surtaxing the husband for
any year prior to 1927, as to taxpayers in any state so losing in
the Courts.
Since the passage of the 1928 Revenue Act containing this pro-
vision, counsel for the community property taxpayers have asked
the Treasury Department to take a pronouncement declaring that
the discretion thereby vested in the Treasury would not be exer-
cised in the direction of making any re-assessment for years prior
to 1927 in the event of a reversal of the present practice by reason
of an adverse decision of the Supreme Court as to the taxpayers
in any state. In May, 1929, Secretary Mellon gave this assurance
in the form of a letter addressed to Hon. John N. Garner, repre-
sentative in Congress from Texas. In his letter Secretary Mellon
says.
"The Treasury has decided, as you know, that no
change would be made in its position" (permitting sep-
arate returns by husband and wife, dividing community
incomes) "with respect to years prior to 1927. Because
of the exceptionally difficult problems and the conflicting
positions of the government, this is clearly a situation in
which the authority granted in the Revenue Act of 1928,
to make changes in our regulations for future application
only, should be exercised."
This assurance applies only to years prior to 1927. The pending
test suits will settle the legal status for 1927 and thereafter. The
discretion of the Secretary, however, will continue to apply to
taxation for all years prior to the date of the final court decision,
in the event that the present practice is thereby held invalid as
to any state.
Consequently, quoting the words of Webster on Massachusetts,
her Lexington and her Bunker Hill, we may say for all years be-
fore 1927, "the past at least is secure." As to the future, the tax-
payers of Washington and six other states rest confidently on
the opinion of Acting Attorney General Mitchell of July 16, 1927,
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declaring that the state law is the supreme test of right on the
subject.
For the preparation of this paper I desire to make grateful
acknowledgment for much valuable data received from Mr. Charles
E. Dunbar, Jr. of New Orleans. The cause of the community
property income taxpayers has been greatly advanced by the splen-
did work of eminent counsel in the other community property
states, notably Mr. Dunbar and Judge Monte M. Lemann of New
Orleans, Mr. R. C. Fulbright of Washington, D C., Mr. Rhodes
S. Baker of Dallas and Mr. Palmer Hutcheson of Houston, all of
whom have rendered invaluable service at various stages of the
controversy GEORGE DONWORTE.
AUTHOR'S SUPPLEMENTAL NOTE
Since the preparation of the foregoing paper my attention has
been called to a ruling of the Income Tax Unit published March 4,
1929, reported in Cumulative Bulletin VIII-9-4122, I. T. 2457,
as follows
"Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928
An amendment of the Civil Code of California Passed by the
California Legislature, approved by the governor April 28, 1927,
in effect July 29, 1927, reads as follows
Section 1. A new section is hereby added to the civil code to be
known as section 161a thereof to read as follows
161a. The respective interests of the husband and wife in com-
munity property during continuance of the marriage relation are
present, existing and equal interests under the management and
control of the husband as is provided in sections 172 and 172a of
the civil code. This section shall be construed as defining the
respective interests and rights of husband and wife in community
property
The Supreme Court of California in the case of Stewart v.
Stewart, July 18, 1928, (269 Pac., 439), held that this section of
the code, whatever effect it may have upon community property
acquired subsequent to its effective date, cannot in any manner
relate to or govern the ownership of property acquired prior thereto.
In view of section 161 (a) of the California Civil Code, and
pending final adjudication in court of the questions as to whether
*Of the Seattle bar- formerly United States District Judge for the
Western District of Washington. The foregoing paper was read by Judge
Donworth at the annual meeting of the Washington State Bar Association
at Olympia, August 15, 1929.
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the Government may tax to the husband the entire community in-
come which under the State law is under his management and con-
trol, husband and wife domiciled in California may each hereafter
in rendering original separate returns report one-half of the income
from community property acquired on and after July 29, 1927.
Where community property was acquired prior to that date, the
ineome therefrom may not be divided for income tax purposes but
is taxable to the husband in its entirety, regardless of when such in-
come is received. Husband and wife may hereafter report in
original separate returns one-half of salaries, wages, and fees earned
by either spouse on and after July 29, 1927, which are community
property"
GEORGE DoNWoRTE.
